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This paper is designed as an expository treatment of the process
of popular legislation at the state level in Ohio. The primary con-
cern is with the "how" of the subject without critical re-exami-
nation of the "why." The policy aspects are intriguing; they chal-
lenge separate discussion in relation to possible constitutional re-
vision in Ohio.1
The initiative is a device by which any person or group of per-
sons may draft a statute and, by securing to a petition the signatures
of a minimum number of qualified voters, require the appropriate
state officials (with or without action upon it by the legislature)
to submit the measure to the electorate at a general or special elec-
tion.2 If an initiated measure is approved by the required major-
ity, it becomes a law. In some states the device may be employed
to amend the constitution. The true initiative has two forms. The
direct initiative gets a measure to the voters without the necessity
for first submitting it to the legislature in order to permit consider-
ation there before referral to the voters may be required.3
The referendum is a device whereby a measure, already
adopted by a representative legislative body or constitutional con-
vention, is held in suspense until it shall have been submitted to
the voters at a general or special election, there to be ratified or
rejected by majority vote.4 There are compulsory, voluntary and
optional types of referenda. In the case of the compulsory refer-
Dean of the College of Law, The Ohio State University.
"Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
I At the general election in November 1952 the voters of Ohio are sched-
uled to vote, under Section 3 of Article XVI of the constitution, on the ques-
tion "Shall there be a convention to revise, alter or amend the constitution?"
For a general discussion of this subject, see Fordham, Some Aspects of Con-
stitut'onal Revision in Ohio, 23 Omio BAR 181 (1950).
21 Bulletins for thle Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18,
p. 183. Mr. Luce would confine "initiative" literally to initiating the making
of law: ".... taking the terms as we find them, we shall approach clear think-
ing if we try to restrict 'initiative' to that independent process whereby an
electorate begins the making of a law; 'referendum' to that process whereby
an electorate completes or prevents the making of a law; and 'direct legis-
lation' to that process of law-making wherein a representative body plays
either a subordinate part or no part at all." LucE, LEGIrATI Paincnrs 565
(1930).
31 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18,
p. 183.
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endum a measure must go to the electors and receive a majority
vote before it may become operative. This type is used to a great
extent in the amending of state constitutions. The voluntary type
is referral to the voters by the legislature at its own instance.
Under the optional form a referendum is had responsive to a
petition of a percentage of the electors. It is the optional type
which is usually embraced in the combination of the initiative
and referendum.
Although these devices did not gain a foothold in the United
States, as applied to ordinary legislation, until the end of the
nineteenth century, popular legislation is a governmental process
of great antiquitys The initiative, in its modern form, was born
in Switzerland about about a century ago.6
It was in 1898 that popular legislation secured constitutional
recognition in American state government. In that year South
Dakota amended her constitution to permit the use of the initia-
tive and referendum at the statutory level 7 In the years from
1900 to 1909 six states followed the example of South Dakota.8
Four of these states extended the initiative provisions to amend-
ments to their state constitutions.9 In the so-called "progressive
era," 1910 to 1915, twelve states adopted provisions permitting
both the initiative and the referendum.1 0 Ten of those states, includ-
ing Ohio, made the initiative available as to constitutional amend-
ments.'1  New Mexico and Maryland have provided for the
referendum alone. 12 There has been scant development since 1915;
only Massachusetts has been added to the list of initiative and
5 LOBINGIE, Tim PEOPLE'S LAw 1 (1909).
6 Rappard, The Initiative, Referendum and Recal in Switzerland, 63 TzE
ANNALs 110, 131 (1912).
7 S. DAK. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
8 The states, with dates of original adoption noted, are: Utah, Art. VI,
§ 1(2) (1900); Oregon, Art IV, §§ 1, la, Art. IX, §3 1, la, Art. XI, § 10, Art.
XVII, § 1 (1902); Montana, Art. V, § 1 (1906); Oklahoma, Art. V, §§ 1-4, 6-8,
Art. XVIII, § 4(a) to 4(e) (1907); Maine, Art. IV, Pt. I, § 1, Art. XXXI (1908);
Missouri, Art. I, §§ 49-53, Art. XII, § 2B (1908).
9 Utah, Oregon, Oklahoma and Missouri.
10 The states with dates of original adoption noted, are: Arkansas, Art V,
9 1 (1910); Colorado, Art. V, § 1 (1910); Arizona, Art. IV, § 1, Art. XXI, § 1,
Art. XXII, § 14 (1911); California, Art. IV, §9 1, lb (1911); Nebraska, Art. III,§9 1-4 (1912); Washington, Art. II, § 1, Art. XI, § § 2, 4, 10 (1912); Idaho, Art.
flI, § 1 (1912); Ohio, Art. II, §§ 1-ig (1912); Nevada, Art XIX, §§ 1-3 (1912);
Michigan, Art. V, §§ 1, 30, 38, Art XVII, §§ 1-3 (1913); North Dakota, Art.
II, § 25, Art. XV, § 202; Mississippi (1914- held invalid in Power v. Robert-
son, 130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769 (1918)).
11 The exceptions were in Idaho and Washington.
12 The states, with dates of original adoption noted are: New Mexico, Art.
IV, § 1 (1911) and Maryland, Art. XVI (1915).
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referendum states. 13 On the other hand, no state has abandoned
the initiative and referendum, once provision has been made for
them in its constitutional scheme.
There is no federal bar to state use of direct legislation. An
effort was once made to persuade the United States Supreme
Court that the device violated the republican form of government
clause of the Constitution, but the court categorized the contention
as a political question not for judicial determination.14
Ohio adopted the initiative and referendum in 1912. Popular
legislation was one of the liveliest topics of discussion to engage
the attention of the constitutional convention of that year. Among
those who spoke in favor of the innovation was Theodore Roose-
velt, who appeared by invitation. It is of interest, as an historical
aside, that the Colonel even spoke out for the recall of judicial
decisions.' 5 One of the objections which seemed to cause the
most concern was the suggestion that the then still active move-
ment for the single tax would stand a better chance of success in
Ohio through direct legislation than through action of the general
assembly. An accommodation was achieved by so amending the
proposal as to ban resort to direct legislation to embrace Henry
George's darling.
The record of direct legislation in Ohio discloses the interest-
ing fact that the device has been employed more freely at the con-
stitutional than the statutory level. Between 1912 and 1950 twenty-
nine constitutional amendments were proposed by the initiative.
Nine were ratified. During the same period fifteen of twenty-nine
amendments proposed by the general assembly were approved.
Seventeen legislative measures have been proposed by the initiative.
Of these, three were enacted by the general assembly. Three of
those not so enacted were carried to the voters by supplemental
petition; one was adopted. As for the referendum, we find that ten
measures have been referred and, of them, all save one were dis-
approved at the polls.16
13 MAss. CoNsT. Art. of AxmND. LXXIV (1918).
14 Pacific State Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118 (1911).
Is 1 OHio CoNsTiTuAL CoNvmrrIoN 1912, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 378.
Also of interest is Art. IV, § 7 of the constitution as amended in 1912. The
movement for popular legislation led to this amendment whereby through
a petition and an election, the voters of smaller counties could cause a uni-
fication of the probate and common pleas courts.
16 Legislative Reference Division, Ohio State Library, Operation of the
Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 1931; Omo ELEcoN STATisTics.
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1. Matters or Areas to which the Initiative Applies
a. Constitutional Amendments
Sections 1 and la of Article II of the Ohio Constitution reserve
to the "people" the power, through the initiative, to amend the
constitution. There are no express substantive limitations upon
that power. It has been suggested, however, that there is an im-
plied limitation which precludes amendment, in this wise, of the
initiative or referendum sections of the constitution. Were this
not so, it is said, all the procedural protections insisted upon by the
conservative element in the 1912 Convention could be eliminated.
To eliminate "dangers" of this nature; Mr. James P. Richardson
introduced two resolutions in the Massachusetts Convention of
1918, which were designed to place their provisions beyond the
reach of the initiative.17 In Ohio there have been two unsuccess-
ful attempts to amend the initiative and referendum provisions.' s
We are unable to find a rational basis for the asserted limitations.
If certain provisions are considered so important that they should
not be subject to change in this way an express limitation is called
for. Thus, Arizona has provided by an initiated constitutional
amendment that the legislature may not repeal or amend initiated
or referred measures approved by the people,19 and this provision
has been given effect by the courts. 20 While the limitation related
to measures of statutory, and not constitutional dignity, the point
is the same.
17 2 DEBATES ni THE CONSTITUTIONAL CoI'vENTiox, Massachusetts 639, 950.
The resolutions read: "No part of the Constitution which provides for the
establishment of the initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an
initiative petition." These 'amendments were rejected by votes of 106 to 129
and 137 to 140. This gentleman, with others, was successful, however, in
adding the following clause to a provision relating to excluded matter: "No
part of the constitution specifically excluding any matter from the operation
of the popular initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an initiative
petition; nor shall this section be the subject of such a petition." (Italics ours).
18 The first attempt was in 1915 when the people defeated a proposed
amendment to limit elections on twice defeated constitutional proposals and
to prevent the abuse of the initiative. The second attempt, while being ap-
proved at the polls, was short-lived; this was the amendment to Article II,
Section 1, which reserved to the people the legislative power of the referen-
dum on the action of the assembly ratifying a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution. This amendment was declared unconstitutional in Hawke
v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), on the basis of the Federal Constitution. No-
where in the opinions there or in the Supreme Court of Ohio, is found any
argument that the section was invalid as not dealing with a proper subject
of amendment by the initiative.
19 AM. CONST. Art. IV, pt. 1, § 6.
20 State ex rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69, 131 P. 2d 983 (1942);
Williard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417, 248 Pac. 32 (1926).
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b. Legislation
Certain limitations are imposed on the people's power to adopt
initiated laws. Some of these are expressly written into the con-
stitution while others have been worked out in the process of
judicial decision. Article II, Section le, prohibits the use of the
initiative process to enact "a law authorizing any classification of
property for the purpose of levying different rates of taxation
thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single tax on land or
land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule
than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or to person-
al property." While, as we have seen, the single tax movement
was still vigorous in 1912, at this day the fear of the ghost of
Henry George seems very unreal. In view of the relative ease
of amending the constitution, this limitation is pretty weak, in
any event.
The constitutional limitations on the power of the general as-
sembly to enact laws are made applicable in broad terms to popular
legislation. This is generally taken to refer only to substantive
limitations. Constitutional limitations on legislative procedure are
not appropriate to the processes of popular or direct legislation.
The question whether constitutional provisions as to form and
style of bills and laws apply to initiated measures is more trouble-
some. Are they limitations on legislative power? It should be
noted at once that Section Ig of Article II prescribes a form of
enacting clause for initiated measures. That section also refers to
the title of such a measure but is silent as to form and content of
both title and body. It will be remembered that Section 16 of
Article II requires that a bill originating in the general assembly
be confined to a single subject clearly expressed in its title. The
supreme court considers these requirements merely directory,21
but the legislature, to its lasting credit, conscientiously abides by
them anyway. Even if they were, by interpretation, carried over to
the initiative it is not evident that they would harden into some-
thing of a mandatory character. On the same footing is the second
part of the companion requirement that an amendatory law con-
tains the entire section or sections amended and repeal the section
or sections amended (as they theretofore stood) .22 The first part,
21 Well v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Pim v. Nicholson, 6
Ohio St. 176 (1856).
22 This is shown by the approval of the Ohio courts of the doctrine of
repeal by implication. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Bower, 147 Ohio St. 66, 68 N.E. 2d
217 (1947); Goff v. Gates, 87 Ohio St. 142, 100 N.E. 329 (1912); State v. Board
of Commissioners of Wyandot County, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 90 (1897), affirmed
Board of Commissioners v. State ex rel. Cuneo, 57 Ohio St. 661, 50 N.E. 1127
197).
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as to setting the amended sections out at length, is, however, deem-
ed mandatory.23 In the absence of an authoritative ruling on the
question, the sensible course is to adhere to the rule in drafting
an initiated measure of an amendatory character.
The courts have recognized an implicit limitation on the
municipal initiative. The initiative and referendum are reserved to
the "people" of a municipality as to any subject of municipal leg-
islative action.24 It appeared in State ex rel. Smith v. City of Fre-
mont,25 that the state health authorities had ordered the city to
change its water supply source or install purification facilities. The
day before a water filtration plant bond ordinance of the city was
adopted by council on third reading an inconsistent measure, which
called for a change from a river to deep wells as the source of sup-
ply, was put forward by initiative petition. At the next general
election the initiated measure was approved by the voters.
Mandamus to compel action under the initiated ordinance was de-
nied by the supreme court in a brief per curiam opinion on the
theory that the initiative may not be used as a substitute for the
referendum. Council's ordinance was adopted as an emergency
measure and as such was not subject to referendum. Since the
Ohio courts refrain from reviewing legislative declarations of
emergency,26 the effect of the decision is to enable a municipal
governing body to put its measures beyond the reach of either the
initiative or the referendum. This is made the more clear by the
critical statement in the opinion that the initiated measure was an
attempt to repeal legislative action. The attorney general has so
construed the court's language in ruling that the initiative could
not be used to repeal a non-emergency ordinance on which the
ninety-day referendum period had run.27 The municipal initiative
and referendum may be regulated by the exercise of home rule
charter-making power.28 On this basis the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County has decided that a charter provision permitting
repeal of an ordinance by an initiated measure is valid. 2 9
We are not aware of any instance in which this implicit limi-
tation has been invoked at the state level. Nor have we, on the
other hand, found any logical basis for denying its application to
statutes. It is true that under the general statute an initiated ordi-
2 3 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O'Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917).
24 OO CONST. Art. II, § If.
25 116 Ohio St. 469, 157 N.E. 318 (1927).
2 6 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937).
27 1948 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4252.
28 Omo GEN. CODE § 4227-12. Applied in: State ex Tel. Daniels v. Council
of City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 NZ. 2d 913 (1939); Dillon v City
of Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 806 (1927).
29 Ferguson v. Wiegand, 34 Ohio Law Rep. 257 (1931).
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nance is not channeled through council, whereas an initiated statute
must be subjected to consideration by the general assembly. This
provides some procedural basis for a distinction but it is not com-
pelling because, even under the state pattern, the last word is with
the electors. The difficulty is with the proposition per se. As indi-
cated by the dissenters in the Fremont case, the design of the con-
stitutional reservation of powers to the electors was to enable them
to enact legislation as a part of the legislative power of the state on
at least an equal footing with the representative legislative body,
but the decision of the court left them far short of that.3° The leg-
islative body can repeal popular legislationSoa and it can, as we
have seen, by an emergency clause, put a measure beyond reach
of the referendum. Yet, we are told, the electors cannot, by initi-
ative, repeal a legislative enactment.
Initiative and referendum provisions have, in other states, been
declared inapplicable to municipal legislation administrative in
character.32 Considerable confusion has resulted from this rule
due to the difficulty of determining just what action is legislative.
Most of the few Ohio cases involving this problem relate to the
referendum and will be discussed under that head.32 In Goodman
v. Hamilton,33 the court held that an initiated ordinance, authoriz-
ing and directing a city official to enter into a contract with a public
utility company to obtain artificial gas for the city, was legislative
in nature and a valid act. Whatever may be the position taken as
to municipal measures, there is no sound basis that one can readily
perceive for engrafting an exception onto the state initiative and
referendum with respect to measures deemed administrative. Apart
from express limitations, the power reserved to the electors is as
broad as that vested in the general assembly. As a practical matter,
moreover, a local governing body is likely to deal much more di-
rectly with administrative matters than is a state legislature.
Particular note may be made of the fact that the initiative may
be used to levy a state tax or make an appropriation of state funds.
Theoretically, this could have absurd effects upon the state budget.
In practice, the power has not been so employed. The most the
voters have done is repeal the tax on colored oleomargarine by
initiative in 1949.
2. Preliminary Steps
Section Ig of Article II, ordains that the provisions of that sec-
tion (presumably Section I and all its subsections) shall be self-
30 116 Ohio St. 469, 472, 157 N.E. 318 (1927).
30a State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935).
31 Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P. 2d 480 (1939); Note: 122 A.L.R. 769.
-2 Page 523, infra.
33 21 Ohio App. 465, 153 N.E. 217 (1926).
1950]
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executing, except as otherwise provided, and that laws may be
passed to facilitate their operation, "but in no way limiting or re-
stricting either such provisions or the powers herein reserved."
The legislature has enacted implementing sections,3 4 among which
is one requiring proponents to give notice of their intention to
circulate petitions.35 This is done by filing a petition, signed by
one hundred qualified electors, and a summary of the proposal
with the attorney general for examination. 36 If the summary is, in
the opinion of that officer, a fair and truthful statement, he must
so certify.37 A verified copy of the proposal, together with the sum-
mary and the certificate, is then filed with the secretary of state
whose duty it is, in turn, to designate the size, color and weight of
the paper to be used and the general arrangement of the petition.
There are other provisions governing printing, control, and disposal
of blank petitions by the secretary of state, and payment to that of-
ficer by the petitioning committee for the costs of printing.38
The question whether these are all true implementing pro-
visions or constitute restrictions on the powers reserved to the
voters by the constitution has not been adjudicated. It is hardly
cause for serious concern. The requirement of one hundred sig-
natures is not onerous; those signers would be but a tiny fraction
of the immensely larger total needed to get a measure to the legis-
lature and they would serve as some indication to the attorney gen-
eral that the petition was being put forward on a serious basis. It is
required that the summary be reproduced on the printed petition.
The apparent purpose is to help the persons, whose signatures are
sought, to get with facility an understanding of what the proposal
is about. The attorney general doubtless could be required by
mandamus to certify an adequate summary but the supreme court
has denied the writ in an instance where the "summary" was longer
than the text. That, observed the Chief Justice, simply was not a
summary39
3. Form of Petition
The constitution expressly permits the presentation of petitions
in separate parts, but each part must contain all the elements of a
34 Omo GE. CODE §§ 4785-175 to 4785-183.
35 Oao GEN. CODE § 4785-175.
36 The attorney general will not certify unless the summary is accom-
panied by a petition of one hundred signatures. 1930 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio)
No. 1854.
37tUnder a former statute calling for a fair and impartial synopsis the
attorney general ruled that arguments may not be included in a synopsis.
1930 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1854. It is doubted that the statutory change
to "fair and truthful" would affect this ruling.
38 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 4785-175, 4785-176a, 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
39 State ex Tel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 27, 176 N.E. 664 (1931).
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complete petition.40 This is a practical necessity. The constitution
requires that a petition bear "across the top" a prescribed caption4'
and that there be set out in the petition the full text of the proposed
law or proposed constitutional amendment with the prescribed
enacting clause or resolving clause, as the case might be.
The implementing statute 2 goes much further; it not only
prescribes the form of petition but requires that there be elements
not exacted by the constitution. The statute requires that the words
"initiative petition" be placed at the top of the petition. This is to
be followed by a place for numbering each part of the petition.
Next there is a place for inserting the name of the solicitor to whom
the part is issued. Below this is a place for inserting the date of is-
suance. After these items comes the caption required by the con-
stitution. It may be doubted that this departure from the literal
language of the constitution is serious, since the matters set ahead
of the caption are simply useful mechanics for administrative pur-
poses.
The statute requires that, following the constitutional caption,
there be set forth the summary and then the certification of the at-
torney general as to the summary, under proper date. Then must
follow the names and addresses of a committee of from three to
five members to represent the petitioners in all matters relating to
the petition or its circulation.43 The next item is a notice, printed
in red, that one who signs more than once or signs a name other
than his own or signs when not a qualified voter is subject to
prosecution. Then follows a place for a statement of the amount
the solicitor has received or expects to receive for his services and
from whom. The address of the person paying for the services must
be given. (The solicitor must fill in his part before any elector
signs. Of course, he can fill in "nothing," if he is not working for
pay.) The next item is the following legend before the signatures:
"Sign with ink or indelible pencil. Your name, residence, and date
of signing must be given." The text of the proposal must be set out
immediately following the place for signatures and it must begin
with the prescribed resolving or enacting clause, as the case may
40 OIo CONTST. Art. 11, § 1g.
41 For constitutional proposals, the caption reads: "Amendment to the Con-
stitution Proposed by Initiative Petition to be Submitted Directly to the Elec-
tors." Art. II, § la. For legislative changes the caption reads: "Law Proposed
by Initiative Petition First to be Submitted to the General Assembly." The
capitalization of both captions is slightly changed in OHio GEN. Con § 4785-
176.
42 Oiro GSEN. CODE § 4785-176.
43 The requirement of a committee is ordained by OHio GEx. CODE § 4785-
180. This requirement of a committee of not less than three purports to deny
to the "lone wolf" the rights of the initiative or referendum processes.
1950]
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be. The final item is an affidavit of the solicitor. The precise form
is fixed by the statute.
It should be observed that the statute in requiring a fixed form
of petition uses the qualifying word "substantially", which is de-
signed to obviate any questions based on minor deviations.44
4. Obtaining Copies of Petition for Circulation
As already mentioned, the secretary of state orders the print-
ing of all petitions and retains their possession until certain formal-
ities are complied with. In order for the committee of petitioners
to obtain blank part-petitions, they must file a list of the names
and addresses of the circulators and the number of part-petitions
to be issued to each.45 The secretary of state then places the circu-
lator's name on the particular part-petition and keeps a record of
the serial number and date of issuance of each such petition issued.
Petitions circulated by anyone other than the listed solicitor will
not be accepted by the secretary of state.
5. Signatures to Petitions
The constitution requires that petitions proposing constitutional
amendments bear the signatures of ten per centum of the electors4 6
and those proposing legislation, three per centum.4 Upon these
petitions as well as supplementary initiative petitions, it is neces-
sary that there be the signatures of not less than one-half of the
designated percentage of electors for each of one-half of the counties
of the state.48 The basis upon which the required number of pe-
titioners in any case is determined is the total number of votes cast
for the office of governor at the last preceding election therefor."
The clause "last preceding election" has been taken to refer to
that election next preceding the filing of the petition despite the
fact that the petition filed lacked sufficient signatures and a guber-
natorial election occurred before the additional signatures were
filed.50 The effect of this ruling has been limited by a legislative
directive that the secretary of state shall not accept for filing a
petition which does not purport to contain at least the minimum
number of signatures required.51
Each signer of a petition must be "an elector of the state."5 2
The constitution elsewhere provides that every citizen of the Unit-
44 Omo GN. CODE § 4785-175.
45 Ozio G x. CODE § 4785-176a.
46 OHIO CONSz. Art. I1, § Ia.
4 7 OHIO CoNsT. Art. II, § lb.
4
s Ozo. CONST. Art. II, § lg.
491bid;.OHxo GEN. CODE § 4785-182.
SOState ex Yet. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171, 187 N.E. 301 (1933).
51 Omo GEN. CoDE § 4785-177d.
52 OHIO CoNsT. Art. 11, § 1g.
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ed States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a
resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of
the county, township, or ward, in which he resides, such time as
may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector,
and be entitled to vote at all elections. 3 Voting privileges may,
however, be limited by registration statutes so long as they are
reasonable in their requirements. 4 In enacting legislation to im-
plement the initiative and referendum provisions, the general as-
sembly saw fit to employ the registration device and required that
each signer be a qualified elector of the county, and a registered
voter, if he resided in a registration city or precinct.55 Although a
person may be a qualified elector when he signs a petition his name
will not be counted if he is not a voter at the time the petition is
examined by the county board of elections. 6 A change of residence
within a precinct or a correct entry on the petition of the street
address coupled with a mistaken entry of the ward and precinct
will not invalidate a signature. 57
The constitution prescribes that the names of all signers to a
petition shall be written in ink, each signer for himself, and that
each signer shall place on the petition, after his name, the date of
signing and his place of residence.58 Residents of municipalities
must note their municipality, street and number (if any), ward
and precinct. Any other signer must state the township and coun-
ty in which he resides. The implementing legislation requires, in
addition, that the rural route or other post office address of non-
municipal residents be shown. 9
In one particular, legislation lessens the strictness of the proc-
ess; the constitution specifies signing in ink, the statute calls for
ink or indelible pencil 60 This has passed muster in the courts on
the theory of substantial compliance.6 1 But it has been held that
the requirements as to the date of signing, the residence of the
signer and his ward or precinct are mandatory and failure to place
53 OMo CONST. Art. V, § 1; Sections 5 and 6 of this article deny residency
to the military under certain conditions, and deny the privileges of electors
to idiots and insane persons.
54 State ex rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 101 Ohio St. 370, 130 N.E. 29 (1920);
Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N.E. 538 (1885).
S5 OHio GEx. CODE §§ 4785-34 (1945) and 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
S56 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-178.
57 In the Matter of Initiative Petitions, 3 Ohio Supp. 260 (CI'. 1939).
SS Onro CowsT. Art. II, § 1g.
59 Outo GEN. CODE § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
60 OsRo GEN. CODE § 4785-176.
61 Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532 (1922), In re Referendum
Petition, 18 Ohio NI'. (N.S.) 140 (1915). A ruling by the attorney general,
however, holds that signatures in black or colored pencil are invalid. 1939
Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
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that material on the petition is fatal to the validity of the signa-
ture. 6 2 This information may, however, be written on the petition
by another, at the direction and with the authority of the elector,
since the mandate as to signing, "each signer for himself," is deem-
ed to refer to the signature alone.63
One further limitation relating to signers of petitions is pre-
scribed by statute. Each part-petition which is filed must contain
signatures of electors of only one county.6 The attorney general
has ruled that this provision tends to facilitate the operation of the
initiative and referendum and that any part-petition which bears
signatures of electors of two or more counties is invalid. 0 This
holding could be exploited to advantage by opponents of a petition
by getting signatures of out-of-county electors on the petition; ap-
parently there would be no criminal liability although the elector
signed only to defeat the petition.
May one who has signed, later withdraw his signature from
the petition?U Without the benefit of statute the supreme court
held signers to have this privilege on referendum petitions if the
withdrawal was made before official action was taken on the pe-
tition.6 7 Any doubt was resolved by the enactment of a provision
which now permits an elector to withdraw his name at any time
prior to the time the part-petition bearing his signature is returned
by the county board of elections to the secretary of state.0 8 This
must be done by written request to the board of elections. Further
complications might be caused should an elector first withdraw
his signature, then change his mind and seek to reinstate it. In a
somewhat similar situation dealing with remonstrances to school
district changes, the attorney general ruled that this could be
done.69
6. Circulation and Verification of Petitions
Solicitors must retain possession of incomplete petitions or
part-petitions and may not leave them at any place for signing out
62 In re Referendum Petition, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 140 (1915); 1932 Ops.
Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4272.
6 3 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933).
64 Omo Gzs. CoDo § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
65 1949 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 783; Informal Opinion of the Attorney
General (Ohio) No. 464, January 4, 1949.
66 Note: 85 A.L.R. 1373 (1933).
67 State ex rel. Kahle v. Rupert, 99 Ohio St. 17, 122 N.E. 39 (1918); but
see State ex rel. v. Lemon, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 151 (1925).
68 Omo GN. CoDE § 4785-177a (Supp. 1949).
691933 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 984. This opinion can, however, be
distinguished as the attorney general ruled that signatures could be added




of their presence.7 0 It is required that any petition or part-petition
left in violation of this provision be seized on behalf of the county
board of elections and forwarded, with an affidavit explaining the
seizure, to the secretary of state. Notice and hearing must be given
the solicitor and each member of the committee for the petitioners.
The statute puts the burden of proof on the solicitor and if he does
not sustain it the secretary of state must destroy the petitions or
part-petitions in question.71
The constitution requires that each part-petition must be veri-
fied by affidavit of the solicitor, which shall set forth (1) the "num-
ber of signers" of the part-petition; (2) that each signature was
attached to the part-petition in the presence of the affiant; (3) that
the signatures were attached with knowledge of the contents of
the petition; (4) that each signature was entered on the date placed
after it; (5) that "to the best of his knowledge and belief" each
signature is genuine; and that "he believes" the signers to be
electors.72 This section also prescribes that "no other affidavit
thereto shall be required." The form of affidavit prescribed by
statute demands more of the affiant. It requires the circulator to
swear positively that the signers were electors and that the signa-
tures are of the persons whose names they purport to be.73 This
places a burden on the solicitor to determine as a fact the identity
of a signer and his qualifications as an elector.
Defects in the affidavit will invalidate a part-petition even
though all of the signatures are genuine signatures of electors. By
statute a part-petition is not properly verified if the statutory form
of affidavit is not properly filled out and signed; is altered by erasure
or interlineation; or is false in any respect.74 There is a like pro-
vision as to the case of a person signing more than once. This is
rather harsh. Accidents do happen in circulating petitions and,
should the circulator have two petitions on separate subjects and
a signer inadvertently signed one twice, it would seem folly to in-
validate the whole petition; especially if the circulator caught the
error and in his affidavit reported the signatures as but one.
The courts, likewise, seem very strict in cases concerning the
verification of petitions. They deem the provisions mandatory and
hesitate to rely upon the doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus,
in a case relating to a municipal referendum, it was held that the
omission to state that the electors signed with knowledge of the
contents was fatal to the validity of the petition.7 5 And, in the days
70 0mo Gsa. CODE § 4785-176b.
71 bid.
72 Omo CoNsT. Art. II, § 1g.
7- Orno GEN. CODE § 4785-176.
74 Omo GEx. CODE § 4785-176c.
7S The Ohio Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Hagerty, 14 Ohio App. 393
(1921); motion to certify overruled, 19 Ohio Law Rep. 172.
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when the secretary of state, rather than boards of elections, ruled
upon petitions, the supreme court sustained his action in rejecting
the whole document when the affidavit was false or not in part
sworn to.70 The attorney general has ruled that the secretary of
state should reject the entire part-petition when the affidavit is un-
signed by the circulator or notary.77 He did not, however, consider
an incorrect date on the affidavit as an invalidating irregularity. 78
7. Filing of Petitions; Review; Protest; Additional Signatures
All initiative and referendum petitions are filed in the office
of the secretary of state.79 Part-petitions must be filed at one time
and all outstanding part-petitions must be invalidated and may not
thereafter be accepted for filing.80 A part-petition becomes void
unless filed within eighteen months after the date of its issuance.9 1
The secretary of state may not accept for filing any petition which
does not purport to contain at least the minimum number of sig-
natures required.8 2
In the case of a proposed constitutional amendment the secre-
tary of state must make the submission to the voters at the next
succeeding regular or general election "in any year occurring
subsequent to ninety days after the filing" of the petition.8 3 To
calculate the ninety-day period referred to, the day of filing is in-
cluded and the election day excluded.8 4 It will be observed that
this is the reverse of the rule followed in determining whether an
act has been done within a period limited by law. In that situation
the first day is excluded and the last counted.8 5 The limitation is
mandatory; the decision of the secretary of state is not conclusive,
but subject to review by the courts.80 While the constitutional sec-
tion undoubtedly precludes the secretary of state from submitting
an amendment at an election unless ninety days have elapsed since
the filing, the attorney general has ruled that the section requires
that the petition be submitted in the same year as the election
and, thus, that the secretary of state may not hold the petition un-
76 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914).
77 1939 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. In a case dealing with municipal
matters, it has been held that an affidavit is not defective because the notary
was the attorney for the affiant and did not stamp, type or print his name
under his signature. City of Gallipolis v. State ex rel. Houckr, 36 Ohio App.
258, 173 N.E. 36 (1930).
78 1939 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
79 OHIo CoNsT. Art. II, §§ la, 1b.
80 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
81 Omo GEN. CODE §4785-177b.
82 OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-177d.
8 3 OIO CoNsT. Art. II, § la.
84 Thrailldil v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532 (1922).
85 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933).
8 6 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925).
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til the next year's general election.8 7 He thought this interpretation
necessary to give effect to the words "in any year". There was,
however, another choice. The words "occurring subsequent", and
so on, would, according to ordinary rules of grammar, be taken to
refer to the words which immediately precede them in the sentence.
The next preceding words are "in any year". Thus, we might say
that the indicated election is the first regular or general election
in a year which shall have begun over ninety days after the petition
shall have been filed. Under this construction the process is ad-
mittedly slow but the petitioners are assured that their proposal
will eventually get to the voters. The attorney general's view, on
the other hand, puts the quietus on a petition if filed too late in a
given year.88
An initiated legislative proposal filed not less than ten days
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly,
must be submitted to the assembly when it convenes. 89 It seems
clear enough that the secretary of state must hold over this type
of petition, if submitted less than ten days before a session, in
order to submit it to the succeeding assembly.90
Once a petition has been filed, the secretary of state must
separate the part-petitions by counties and transmit them to the
county boards of elections of the respective counties to determine
their sufficiency.91 It has been determined that this requirement
is not restrictive of the constitutional scheme. 92 In the event that
part-petitions are defective, a question arises as to who shall be
judge of their sufficiency. In a case involving a now-repealed sec-
tion of the General Code, it was held that the secretary of state
should judge the sufficiency and his decision was final so long as
he did not act fraudulently or abuse his discretion.93 The next
assembly changed this to vest the authority in the county boards
of elections, including the power "to scrutinize for the omission
of any of the formal or other requirements set forth in the con-
871949 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 753.
S This difficult, may be overcome by the proponents of a petition by
withholding the petition from filing until the first of the following year. Sig-
natures for petitions seeking constitutional amendments may be obtained in
the year proceding the year in which the petition is filed. 1913 Ops. Att'y
Gen. (Ohio) No. 83. It must be noted, however, that the life span of each
part-petition is only eighteen months from the date of issuance to the date
of filing. OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-177b.
89 0HIO Consr. Art. II, § lb.
90 Art. II, § lb reads in part: "When at any time, not less than ten days
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly,
(Italics ours).
91 OHIo Gm;. CoDo § 4785-178.
92 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939).
93 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914).
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stitution.94 Under this state of facts the supreme court held that
the secretary of state was under a duty to transmit immediately
the part-petitions to the county boards and would be precluded
by a writ of prohibition from proceeding to hear and determine
the sufficiency of petitions on file25 This has since given way to
a provision that the boards shall determine "the omission of any
necessary details provided by law."96 The changes in the statutes
were enough to cause a modification in but not the overthrow of
the previous ruling. Thus, in late 1939, the supreme court held that
the secretary of state could reject petitions not verified as directed
by the constitution. If the signatures lost from this means de-
creased the total so as to be under the number required the
secretary then need not transmit them to the local boards.97 This
decision was effective in overruling an opinion of the attorney
general, given a few days earlier, which ruled that the secretary
of state could invalidate all part-petitions or signatures void on
their face.98
Should the secretary of state refuse to proceed after invali-
dating petitions ineffectively verified, the petitioners would ap-
parently have to start over. While the constitution grants ten
additional days to file "additional signatures" to petitions verified
as provided for but proved to be not in all respects sufficient, the
doctrine of the last cited case 99 would limit this grant to cases
where the petitions were properly verified but the petition or cer-
tain signatures were voided for other reasons.
Should the part-petitions contain sufficient signatures even
after the secretary has refused those on unverified part-petitions,
the secretary must transmit them to the county boards. The boards
then proceed to determine the validity of the part-petitions and
signatures. The boards must ascertain whether each part-petition
is properly verified.10 0 Undoubtedly this includes the power to
reject part-petitions outright, if they are, on their face, unverified
because of the omission of the signature of the notary or circula-
tor.10 1 But the power to reject part-petitions goes further than this.
94 113 Ohio Laws 307.
9S State ex rel. McCrehen v. Brown, 108 Ohio St 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
96 OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-178.
97 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 NX. 2d 907 (1939);
but see Oio GEN. CODE § 4785-7 (Supp. 1949) which says it shall be the duty
of the secretary of state "to determine the sufficiency of all initiative and
referendum petitions on state questions . . . as hereafter provided."
98 1939 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
99 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939).100 OHo GEN. CODE § 4785-178.
lOl This would be occasioned only if the petition slipped through the sec-
retary of state as he also has such authority by reason of the Mitchell Case.
See note 95, supra.
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The boards may reject them for falsified affidavits, signatures of
electors from more than one county, or omissions of any necessary
details required by law. The boards have authority to administer
oaths, issue subpoenas, summon witnesses and compel the pro-
duction of documents in conducting investigations. 102 A board
likewise may reject certain signatures on otherwise valid part-
petitions if those signatures are not of persons on the registration
lists of a registration city, or on the polling lists of the county,
or eligible to vote in the county or are not electors at the time of
the board's examination.10 3 It may further reject illegal signatures;
signatures written other than in ink or indelible pencil; and sig-
natures followed by no date or an incorrect date. It must determine
any repetition or duplication of signatures.
After investigating a board must make notes opposite each
rejected signature and make a report to the secretary of state in-
dicating the sufficiency or insufficiency of the signatures and
indicating whether or not each part-petition is properly verified. 0 4
Any circulator of a particular part-petition, any signature on
which or the verification of which has been declared insufficient
or which is held to be not verified by a county board, may protest
the board's findings. 0 5 The protest may be filed by the interested
committee or any elector, as well. There is no expressed grant of
the right of protest against action invalidating petitions or parts
thereof for other causes. Should such a protest as is permitted be
filed, the board must proceed to test its findings by bringing an
action in the common pleas court of the county within three days
after the filing of the protest. A judge of the court hears the action
and certifies his decision to the board. The latter returns only the
verified signatures and part-petitions to the secretary of state,
including therewith the report of the board. These materials must
be returned not less than fifty days before the election except that
for petitions initiating legislation, the board shall "promptly check
and return" the petitions and report.
The chronology relating to protests seems somewhat confused.
The constitution provides that petitions and signatures upon such
petitions, verified as provided in the constitution, shall be presumed
to be in all respects sufficient, unless not later than forty days
before the election, they shall be otherwise proved, and in such
an event, ten additional days shall be allowed for the filing of ad-
ditional signatures. 10 6 The framers, however, failed to some extent
102 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-179b (Supp. 1949).
103 Omo Gm . CODE § 4785-178.
104 Ibid.
105 0mo GEN. CODE § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
106 Omno CoNsT. Art. II, § 1g. This forty-day provision was applied in
State ex rel. Vail v. Fulton, 97 Ohio St. 325, 120 N.E. 140 (1917).
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in making these provisions self-executing by not providing a method
whereby the petitions or signatures could be proved insufficient.
This section would, however, stop an opponent of a petition from
protesting a signature immediately before an election and thus
throwing a monkey wrench into the whole proceedings. It relates
simply to proving matters insufficient and it could not, therefore,
preclude a protest by a circulator objecting to a board's ruling a
signature insufficient. Moreover, under the definition of "so veri-
fied" used in the Mitchell case, 0 7 it would not even stop an out-
sider protesting the day before the election on the ground that the
part-petitions were improperly verified.
The statutes set no express time limits within which protests
must be filed. One may, however, be implied from the general
arrangement of the section dealing with protests. This section 0 8
provides, in the following order, for (1) the right of protest, (2) a
court action, (3) submission to the secretary of state and his an-
nouncement of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the whole petition,
and (4) an extension of ten days in which to file valid signatures.
It could be implied therefrom that all rights of protest cease upon
the notification by the secretary of state.
On the other hand, the statutes calls for no notice to the com-
mittee, circulator, or general public until the notification men-
tioned above is given. Without notification of the board's findings,
how may we properly expect anyone to be able to take advantage
of the right to protest?
One further possible interpretation, with respect to consti-
tutional amendment, supplemental, or referendum petitions lies
in the fact that the "properly verified part-petition" (certified so
by the court) shall be returned to the secretary of state not less
than fifty days before the election. This might be construed to de-
feat any protest submitted later than the aggregate period needed
for the board to commence an action in the court, and for the
court's decision and certification plus a span of fifty days.
If the petition should be found insufficient because of an in-
sufficient number of valid signatures, the committee must be
notified and is allowed ten additional days after notification for
the filing of additional signatures m 9 This ten-day provision does
not relate to petitions which on their face do not purport to contain
107 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939). See note 95, supra.
10 OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
109 OHIO CoxST. Art. II, § ig; OHIo Gmu. CoDE § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
This provision does not apply when a defect in a part-petition operates to
reduce the number of counties represented on the petition to a number less




sufficient signatures, for these are not even accepted for filing."0
Apparently in such a case the committee would not be limited,
except indirectly, in obtaining additional signatures. Where, how-
ever, a petition purports to contain sufficient signatures, but does
not because of rejections by the county boards of elections, or
the courts, the ten-day extension provision applies.
The requirements as to the filing of additional signatures fol-
low the pattern of the original petition. The secretary of state,
upon request of the committee, issues new part-petitions for the
obtaining of new signatures.' No signature on a "supplemental
part-petition,"1"7 which is the same as a signature on an original
part-petition, may be counted. The properly-verified original part-
petitions and the new supplemental petitions which appear to the
secretary of state to be properly verified are forwarded to the
county boards of elections for determination of the validity and
sufficiency of the new part-petitions. These must be returned to
the secretary of state within five days. No provision authorizes
review of the board's findings either by the secretary of state or
the courts. Upon receipt of the county board's reports, the secre-
tary of state must determine the total number of signatures to the
petition which he shall record and announce. Should they be
sufficient, then such amendment, proposed law, or law, shall be
placed on the ballot as required by law."3 Should the petition
be found insufficient, the committee must be so notified and their
only apparent recourse would be to start all over again.
8. Submission to the General Assembly
As mentioned earlier, initiated legislation in Ohio must first
be submitted to the general assembly. The direct initiative does
apply at the constitutional level; proposed amendments are placed
directly on the ballot.
If a sufficient petition is filed with the secretary of state not
less than ten days prior to the commencement of any session of
the general assembly, the secretary of state must transmit it to
110 OHIO GEN. CODE § 4785-177d.
III OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
112 So called in OHIO GEN. CODE § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949), but this should
not be confused with petitions to submit laws to the people after the general
assembly has refused to enact an initiated proposal. As to this limitation, a
question might arise should an elector sign the original petition and then the
"supplemental" petition after his original signature was rejected for lack of
proper verification, for example.
113 OHIo GEN. CODE § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). The failure of the section
to mention submission of a proposed law to the general assembly was appar-
ently an inadvertence.
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the general assembly as soon as it convenes.1 1 4 The initiated mea-
sure is certified as being sufficient to the assembly and is there
formally introduced by one of the members; usually by the speaker
as a house bill. Neither the constitution nor statutes deal speci-
fically with legislative procedure on initiated proposals, but the
assembly generally treats them as if introduced by an individual
member. Once the bill is submitted, the committee favoring the
adoption of the proposal loses its semi-official status and has no
more right to lobby for the bill or explain its merits than does
any ordinary citizen.
Should the bill receive favorable attention of the assembly
and pass either as petitioned for or in amended form, it is subject
to veto by the governor 15 and to independent referendum by the
electors.11 6
If the bill is not passed, or if no action is taken thereon within
four months from the time of receipt by the general assembly, or
if passed in amended form, the original proposal may be placed
on the ballot if sufficient supplemental petitions are properly
filed.11 7 But the attorney general has ruled that the assembly is
not precluded from considering an initiated bill because more
than four months have elapsed since it was received 1 6
In order to demand the submission of the proposal to the
voters supplementary petitions verified as were the original part-
petitions and signed by not less than three per centum of the elec-
tors, in addition to those signing the original petition, must be filed
with the secretary of state. 119 The supplementary petition may
propose the law either as first petitioned for or with any amend-
ment or amendments which may have been added by either or
both branches of the general assembly.12 0 There seems to be no
114 Omo CoNsT. Art. TT, § lb. The use of the word "any" would seem to
support the holding over of such petitions from one session until the next.
One serious limitation on the word "any" might exist with respect to special
sessions. OMo CoNsT. Art. m, § 8 provides that special sessions shall be
called by the governor and no business shall be transacted at such session
except that named in the governor's proclamation or subsequent proclama-
tion or message or provision for the expenses of the session or other matters
incidental thereto.
1 1 5 Omo CONST. Art. II, § 16 provides in part: "Every bill passed by the
general assembly shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the governor
for his approval." In the initiative sense a bill vetoed by the governor would
hardly have been finally passed.
1 16 Onio CONST. Art. II, § lb. This provision, as distinguished from a
carry-through election on an initiated measure, would, no doubt, be defeated
should the assembly amend the proposal by adding an emergency clause.
1 17 OHO CONST. Art. II, § lb.
1181933 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 903.




provision limiting the supplementary petition procedure to the
original sponsors. Should they decide to step out any other group
could, apparently, carry on from that point. However, should the
second group succeed in its task, controversy might arise as to
which group would be entitled to prepare the arguments in sup-
port of the measure."'
If the assembly should pass the proposal in amended form,
the filing of a supplementary petition would prevent the enacted
bill from becoming effective until the version proposed in the
supplementary petition was rejected at the polls.' 2 In that situ-
ation, the supplementary petition would have the features both of
the initiative and of the referendum. Should the bill as enacted
in amended form contain an emergency clause, it is doubtful that
it would be subject to the referendum as such,123 but the same
would hardly be true as to the referendum features of a supple-
mentary petition, else the basic design of ultimate electoral action
on an initiated measure could be defeated.
Most of the formalities and procedures relating to an original
petition govern supplementary petitions. In some respects, how-
ever, such procedures are not fitted to the supplementary petition,
and in others, express contrary provisions govern. It might be
questioned whether those invoking the supplementary petition
procedure need always file with the attorney general a synopsis
and one-hundred signature petition. The section requiring those
relates only to "initiative" or "referendum" petitions. 124 It is doubt-
ful if these words are to be strictly construed, however, since
most of the sections125 use this language, or the even looser word,
"petition." In one situation, however, such a requirement seems
superfluous; that is, where the measure to be submitted is the
same as proposed to the general assembly and the committee wishes
to use a synopsis, already certified as fair and truthful by the
attorney general. In an opinion concerned with a similar statute
the attorney general ruled that a previously-certified synopsis
might be used on a supplementary petition without a new certifi-
cation when the supplementary petition proposed the same, and
not an amended measure.1 2 6 In other instances this requirement
has as much merit as when applied to the original petitions; for
121 See page 517, infra.
12 2 OHIO CONST. Art. 1I, § lb.
123 OHO CoNsT. Art. II, § d.
124 0nio GEN. CODE § 4785-175.
125 OHro GE. CODE §§ 4785-175 through 4785-182.
126 1927 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 235. The statute then provided that
petitioners "may submit" to the attorney general a synopsis of a proposed
law.
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example, when the proposal to be submitted is an amended version
of the original.
The requirements as to printing, forms, circulators, signatures
and circulation and determination of sufficiency are generally the
same as with the original petitions. The form is varied to a slight
extent by inserting the word "supplementary" before the word
"initiative" in the title of the petition or part-petition. 127 Once
again ten days are given to file additional signatures should a
supplementary petition be found insufficient because of rejections
of signatures or part-petitions.' 28
The times of filing prescribed for supplementary petitions
are, of course, different from those for the original petition. To be
effective a supplementary petition must be filed with the sec-
retary of state within ninety days after the proposed law shall
have been rejected by the general assembly or after the expiration
of a term of four months during which no action was taken on
the proposal or after the law as passed by the assembly has been
filed with the secretary of state by the governor. 12 9 It has been held
that a motion to postpone a bill indefinitely amounts to action on
and a rejection of a bill for present purposes. 3 0 Where the assembly
has adjourned without taking definite action on a bill the ad-
journment will be treated as a rejection and the ninety-day period
will commence at that date.131 The secretary of state initially de-
cides if a petition was timely filed, but the ninety-day time limit
is mandatory, of course, and an error in computation is subject
to judicial correction. 132
9. Information to the Electors
The constitution comtemplates that the electors be "briefed",
as it were, on initiated proposals which are to appear on the ballot.
The information to be distributed consists of a true copy of a
proposed law or proposed amendment to the constitution and argu-
ments or explanations, or both, for and against the proposal. 1 3
127 OHIo Gmx. CoDE § 4785-176.
128 OIo GEN. CODE § 4785-179. In such an instance, the legislative termi-
nology becomes confusing since the section calls the additional signatures
petition a supplemental petition. Thus one can file a supplemental petition
to a supplemental petition.129 Omo CoNsT. Art. II, § lb.
13o Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925); 1925 Ops. Atty Gen. (Ohio)
p. 134; see also Rule 100, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General
Assembly of Ohio (1949).
131 Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913).
132 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925).
133 Omo CoN.ST. Art. , § 1g. This provision was held to be self-executing.
State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant, 93 Ohio St. 1, 112 N.E. 138 (1915). Presum-
ably, this does not require the secretary of state to issue copies of the law
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The committee named in an initiative petition may prepare the
arguments or explanations, or both, in favor of the measure pro-
posed. The person or persons to prepare the statements against
the proposal must be named by the general assembly, if in session;
otherwise, by the governor. 13 4 The arguments or explanations, or
both, must not exceed three hundred words for each side, and
they must be filed at least sixty days before the date of the elec-
tio. 13S There is no requirement that the accuracy of the state-
ments be certified by any public officer. Unlike the expository
statements required by statute for the benefit of prospective petition
signers, this matter is argumentative. Should a statement contain
slanderous remarks, it is doubtful that its authors would be
liable.13 6
When the secretary of state receives any proposed law or
constitutional amendment which would levy any tax or necessi-
tate any expenditure of state funds, he must request of the tax
commissioner an estimate of any prospective annual expenditure
of public funds and the annual yield of any proposed tax. 137 The
tax commissioner must then prepare the estimate. The original
is filed with the secretary of state. From it copies are made to be
distributed with the publicity pamphlet discussed below.
The constitution requires the secretary of state to cause the
proposed law or amendment and the statements to be printed
and to mail or otherwise distribute these materials to each of the
electors of the state, as far as may be reasonably possible.138 Im-
plementing legislation provides that the secretary of state shall,
at least thirty days before the election, cause these materials and
a form of the official ballot, which is to be used, to be printed in
or provision to be amended, but rather to issue copies of the proposed amend-
ment. See 1940 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 2275.134 The general wording of Art. II, § ig is broad enough to require that
arguments be prepared against proposed constitutional amendments but the
section makes no provision for their preparation. Under a former statute
the attorney general ruled that there was no authorization for the prepara-
tion of such arguments. 1915 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 867. While this
statute has been amended, it is doubted that it affects this ruling. See Omo
GEN. CODE § 4785-180a.135 Omro CoNsT. Art. II, § Ig; Oo GEN. CODE § 4785-180a.
136Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N. 2d 584 (1941). Bett-
man, J., observed, obiter, that the governor, secretary of state and the official
authors are absolutely privileged if the remarks objected to are pertinent to
the occasion. The holding of the court was that if there be such a privilege,
it does not extend to an outsider alleged to have conspired with the official
appointees to defame the plaintiff.
13 7 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-175a.
133 OHIO CONsT. Art. II, § 1g. It has been ruled that this duty is manda-
tory though the secretary is not instructed as to the details of the operation.
1927 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1073.
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pamphlet form and must, at least twenty days before the election,
mail or otherwise distribute the pamphlets, charges fully paict'3 9
All costs of printing and distributing these pamphlets are paid
by the state from its general revenue fund.
140
10. Submission to the Electors-Ballot
When a sufficient initiative or supplementary petition has
been properly filed the secretary of state must submit the pro-
posal to the electors. 141 The secretary of state will not be enjoined
from submitting a proposal because it might be inconsistent with
the federal or state constitutions, 142 and should he attempt to
withhold a proposal from the people, mandamus will lie to compel
him to submit the measure.143 He is plainly not concerned with
substance in the policy sense. It seems equally clear that he is not
concerned with the question whether the proposal is inconsistent
with any general limitation on legislative power such as consti-
tutional guaranties of civil liberties. That is the province of the
judiciary in proper cases instituted after the positive enactment.
What, however, of limitations addressed specifically to the initia-
tive, such as the ban on the single tax? May not the secretary
of state properly maintain that he is under no duty to submit
a proposal as to a subject which the constitution places beyond
reach of the initiative? Or is his function simply the ministerial
business of submitting any proposal which measures up in terms
of procedure, technical form and signatures?
The amendment or law proposed by the petition must be
submitted in its original form unless, in the case of a proposed
law, the supplementary petition proposes the law with one or
more of the amendments made by either house of the general
assembly. The only proposal which the constitution requires to
be submitted is that which appears on the petition and the consti-
tution permits no other to be submitted.144
The secretary of state has the duty of preparing the ballots.145
While, as stated above, an initiated petition may propose two or
'39 Omo GEN. CoDE § 4785-180b.
140 OHIO G~r. CODE § 4785-180c.
141 OMo CONST. Art. II, §§ la and lb.
142 City of Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556 (1921);
Weiland v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 10, 121 N.E. 816 (1918); Pfiefer v. Graves, 88
Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913).
143 State ex reZ. Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 138 N.E. 881 (1922).
144State ex -rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 187, 124 N.E. 172
(1919).
145 OHIO CONST. Art. 11, § Ig provides in part: "Unless otherwise provided
by law, the secretary of state shall . . ." The general assembly has not seen
fit to change this, but rather implements the provision by Section 4785-181
of the General Code.
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more unrelated constitutional amendments or statutory sections,
it is less clear whether such proposals may be combined on the
ballot. Article II, Section 1g, provides that the secretary of state
shall "cause the ballots so to be printed as to permit an affirmative
or negative vote upon each law, section of law, or item in a law
appropriating money, or proposed law, or proposed amendment
to the constitution." It has been held that a revised municipal
home rule charter may be submitted as a whole with the voter
having but one vote either for or against it.146 Certainly two or
more sections may be amended by unitary submission if there
is but one fundamental change and the amending of the two or
more sections relates to but a single plan.147 However, the supreme
court has said that two unrelated amendments must be so ar-
ranged on the ballot as to permit the individual voter to voice
his approval of each section separately. 14 This compromise seems
logical, but the real problem is who is to say amendments are
unrelated, or are parts of a single plan? It would appear that the
initial decision is up to the secretary of state. Whether or not the
courts would review such a decision is problematical; we are in-
clined to the view that they would.
Initiated proposals appear on a separate ballot, designated "Of-
ficial Questions and Issues Ballot", and state and local questions
are grouped and arranged so that state questions appear at the
top, county next, municipal next, township next and school district
at the foot.149 Within this pattern the secretary of state decides
the order of listing of state questions. i50
On the "Official Questions and Issues Ballot" the printed
matter relating to each issue must be enclosed at the top and bot-
tom by a heavy horizontal line. Below each top line must appear
a brief title descriptive of the issue, such as "Proposed Consti-
tutional Amendment," or "Proposed Increase in Tax Rate." Fol-
lowing the title must be a brief statement of the percentage of
affirmative votes necessary for the passage of the measure. Next
in order comes the "text describing the question or issue."15' The
statute provides that the "ballot title" of an initiated proposal
shall be determined by the secretary of state but the person or
committee sponsoring the measure may suggest a title which is
146 Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
147 Resort has been made to this system quite often in the past. See, e.g.,
Ohio Election Statistics for General Election Held on the Second Day of
November 1948, page 433 (Two sections of two articles in the constitution were
amended by single vote).
148 State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 176 N.E. 664 (1931).
149 OmIo GE. CODE § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
150 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-181.
151 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
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to be given full consideration. Is2 The secretary of state is instructed
to prepare a true and impartial title, which would be unlikely
to create prejudice for or against the proposal.
Much controversy has arisen over the meaning of the phrase
"text describing the question or issue" and its statutory prede-
cessor, "in language sufficient to clearly designate it." In the case
of State ex rel. Greentund v. Fulton 53 it was declared that a
submission of a proposed amendment to the constitution without
substantial compliance with the provisions of the initiative and
referendum sections of the constitution was invalid. It was not
this innocuous statement that has created confusion, but rather
the lack of a clear majority rationalization. The case has been
cited as standing for the proposition that in the submission of a
state initiative proposal to the voters the exact language of the pro-
posal must be printed on the ballot. S4 Actually, the supreme
court has limited this theory to initiative and referendum meas-
ures on state constitutional questions.15s In both instances, however,
it was dealing with local matters and, as yet, has not definitely
held that the proposition does not apply to initiated legislation.
Short of printing the complete text of a proposal, it seems clear
that all the essential elements or changes must be described on
the ballot. IS6
This text must be placed on the right side of the ballot, be-
neath the short title, and on the left there must be four enclosed
rectangular spaces.15 7 Each space is arranged in the general shape
of a square or rectangle. In the space at the top right must ap-
pear the word "yes", while the word "no" is to appear in the space
just below. The two spaces at the extreme left are provided for
the marking of the ballot. The size of the spaces for affirmative
votes and those for negative votes must be the same.
The submitting of these issues to the voters generally follows
the ordinary election procedures with but a few variations. A
committee which advocates or opposes a measure may appoint
a challenger and a witness to the count in each precinct. 58 This
procedure is handled on a county basis although the committee
need not be a local committee. In order to obtain this privilege,
the committee, acting in good faith, must file a petition with the
county board of elections not later than five days prior to the
election. Should more than one committee file, the board must
152 0mo GEN. CODE § 4785-181.
153 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
IS4Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 132, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
ISSIbid; Prosen v. Duffy, 152 Ohio St. 139, 87 N.E. 2d 342 (1949).
i56 State ex yel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
IS7 0mo GEN. CODS § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
's8Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-120.
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decide and announce its decision by registered mail to each com-
mittee not less than three days preceding the election. This de-
cision is not final; the aggrieved party may institute mandamus
in the common pleas court of the county to compel the board to
accept the appointees of such party. If more than three questions
are submitted, the various committees may agree upon the appoint-
ees so that not more than six challengers and six witnesses will
represent each side of all issues. If the committees cannot so agree,
the judges of elections must make the appointment so that in no
case will there be more than six challengers and six witnesses
appointed for any one election in any one precinct.
The general election laws provide the usual methods for
protests of elections on issues, for announcements of results, proc-
lamations, and certificates.
The constitution expressly validates a proposed amendment
or law which has been submitted to the electors and received
an affirative majority notwithstanding any insufficiency of the
petitions by which the submission was procured.15 9 It is to be
noted that this applies simply to defects in petitions; it does not
purport to obviate failure to comply with other constitutional pro-
visions, such as those pertaining to the submission of initiated
proposals.1 60
11. Effective Date
Any proposed law or amendment to the constitution submitted
to the electors, if approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon, takes effect thirty days after the election at which it
was approved. 161 While there is no apparent method of changing
the technical effective date, the practical effective date could,
no doubt, be delayed by inserting a clause in the proposed meas-
ure which specified a later date for its provisions to become oper-
ative. Thus, a tax measure might provide for the levy to become
applicable the first day of the succeeding calendar year.
As mentioned above, when the general assembly has enacted
a proposal in amended form the effective date is suspended by
the filing of a supplementary petition. Only the law as proposed
in the supplementary petition goes on the ballot for approval or
rejection. Should that measure be rejected, the law as enacted
would go into effect immediately.162 If, however, a majority
of those voting on the submitted proposal should approve the
measure, the legislative act would become a nullity, and the sub-
IS90mo CONST. Art. II, § 1g. See also OHio GEN. CODa § 4785-182.
160 See, e.g., State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St 168, 124 N.E.
172 (1919).
161 Onio CONST. Art. I, § lb.
162 Ibid.
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mitted measure would become effective as the law thirty days
after the election.
12. Conflicting Proposals
The constitution provides that should two conflicting pro-
posed laws or amendments be submitted at any one election, the
one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall be
the law or amendment adopted.163 Apparently, no one has standing
to keep a measure from being submitted to the people because it
duplicates or conflicts with another measure to be submitted.
The reference to laws and amendments rather than conflicting
portions thereof, could conceivably kill off a complete law by
force of a conflict between one of its sections and a section of an
almost entirely unrelated law or amendment.
Another difficulty would be encountered should two proposals
be made to amend one constitutional or statutory section. Article
II, Section 16, of the constitution provides: "No law shall be re-
vived, or amended unless the new act contains the entire act
revived, or the section or sections amended." While this section
applies only to statutory material, it was indirectly used to support
the theory that in Ohio when the whole revised text of a consti-
tutional provision is approved the old unchanged portions are
also passed upon by the assembly or, in case of an election, the
voters.164 This theory was extended by ruling, in effect, that where
two amendments to one constitutional section were proposed, even
if the changes were consistent with each other, if one or both of
the amendments were drafted so as to contain the entire section
revived the proposals would be inconsistent and one must fail.
Perhaps this result could be avoided as to constitutional amend-
ments, by petitioning only for the changes rather than a revised
section. It may be doubted, however, that this could be done as
to initiated bills, as it might be held that the pertinent clause of
Article 11, Section 16, applies to them in view of the provision
that the limitations on the power of the general assembly to enact
laws shall be deemed limitations on the power of the people to
enact laws.165
This inconsistency provision has also been said to apply to
conflicts between amendments proposed by the initiative and the
general assembly.166
While it would be incongruous to permit the governor to veto
any direct action of the people, the constitution singles out in-
163 Ibid.
164 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
16S Omo CONST. Art. H, § 1.
166 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
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itiated laws and expressly provides that they shall not be subject
to such veto. 67
13. Amendment and Repeal of Popular Legislation
May an initiated measure enacted by the electors later be
amended or repealed by the general assembly? 16S Strong policy
arguments can be made on either side of this question. While there
is no authoritative ruling on it at the state level, cases which
arose in the municipal sphere are suggestive. In non-charter mu-
nicipalities the initiative and referendum are governed by general
statute. This has been interpreted to leave the local governing
body with power to repeal an amended ordinance. 169 While the
statutes providing for the initiative on a local basis differ con-
siderably from the provisions for the statewide initiative, neither
deals specifically with our problem, and it seems safe to assume
that the general assembly may repeal or amend initiated laws. A
municipality is free to regulate the subject by home rule charter1 70
and in this way could assure the voters the last word on a particu-
lar measure.171 The question does not exist as to initiated amend-
ments since all constitutional amendments, whether proposed by
convention, initiative or the general assembly, must clear through
the people. In Ohio, only two laws have been enacted by means
of a supplemental initiative petition. The first of these related
to aid to the aged. 172 Apparently the assembly never doubted its
authority to change this act for it has since added sections and
amended or repealed original sections.
REFmrwNum
In framing referendum provisions, the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1912 chose the optional-type referendum. 7 3 In one
area - that relating to the power of the general assembly to au-
thorize associations with banking powers - compulsory referendum
had been exacted by the Constitution of 1851.174 Similarly, consti-
167 Omo CoNsT. Art. II, § lb. Apparently this is done to overcome any
doubt in the particular area, since legislative acts are the only ones expressly
made subject to the veto. See Omo CONST. AnT. H, § 16.
168 See Note 97 A.LR. 1046 (1935).
169 State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935);
1933 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 19.
170 State ex rel. Daniels v. City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E
2d 913 (1939).
171 See, e.g., Section 48 of the Charter of the City of Columbus, Ohio,
which provides that the city council may not amend or repeal an ordinance
adopted by the voters for a period of two years after its passage.
172 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 1359-1 et seq., as adopted by initiative November 7,
1933.
173 Omo CONST. Art. 11.
174 OHIo Cowsr. Art. XIII, § 7.
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tutional amendments proposed by the assembly or constitutional
conventions must be submitted to the voters.175 The provision
relating to associations with banking powers is obsolete; "banking
powers" has been interpreted to apply only to powers employed
in making or issuing paper money or, at most, to the powers ex-
ercised by banks of issue.17 6 In our present national system of
banking and currency, there is no place for state bank notes serv-
ing as a circulating medium.
No express provision of the constitution authorizes the volun-
tary referendum, whereby the legislature voluntarily submits an
act to the people. It has been held that except for the provisions
relating to the initiative and referendum, all legislative authority
must be exercised by the general assembly alone. 7 7 The general
assembly may not delegate to any other body or to the public di-
rectly the power to pass laws.178 Local option laws are a well-
rooted exception to this general principle.17 9
The referendum, with which we are concerned, is the optional
plan.
The constitution reserves two powers of referendum to the
voters of Ohio. The optional referendum is made applicable to
the action of the general assembly in ratifying any proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. °80 This provision
has been a dead letter since the Supreme Court of the United
States decided that the federal constitution, in providing for rati-
fication by the legislatures of the states, means action by repre-
sentative assemblies and not the electors.' 8'
1 75 OHIO CoNsT. Art. XVI.
176 Dearborn v. Northwestern Savings Bank, 42 Ohio St. 617 (1885); Ford-
ham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 Omo BAR 181, 189
(1950).
177 State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St.
464, 473, 166 N.E. 407 (1929). See Note 76 A.L.R. 1053 (1932) on the problem
of whether a referendum may be permitted on a general statute in the absence
of a constitutional authorization.
178 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O'Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917);
State ex rel. Allison v. Garver, 66 Ohio St. 555, 64 N.. 573 (1902); Railway
V. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
179 Gassman v. Kerns, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 626 (C.P. 1908), affirmed in 81
Ohio St. 496 (Mem. 1909); Ely v. Williard, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 571 (C.P. 1904).
1 80 0mo CoisT. Art. II, § 1.
1 8 1 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). This doctrine was extended to
preclude a referendum on an act of the general assembly calling a conven-
tion for the purpose of deciding upon the ratification of a proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. State ex rel. Donnelly v.
Myers, 127 Ohio St. 104, 186 N.E. 918 (1933). But certain state acts affecting
the federal sphere are subject to referendum. Thus, in State of Ohio ex rel.
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The electors may, through the optional referendum, reject
any law, section of any law or item in any law appropriating money
passed by the general assembly, 82 except laws providing for tax
levies, appropriations for the current expenses of the state, and
emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health or safety.' 83 These exceptions from the gen-
eral rule, it has been said, must be construed strictly though
reasonably.' 84
The exemption as to tax statutes has been confined in appli-
cation to state tax levies which are self-executing imposts. The
exemption does not apply to acts, which relate to taxation, as by
regulating tax procedure or by authorizing or limiting local tax-
ation, but do not actually impose tax levies. 83 Thus, an act
imposing a tax limitation upon local governments and creating a
taxing agency is not excepted from the referendum provisions of
the constitution.1 86 The fact, moreover, that an act contains certain
sections which might be subject to referendum probably does not
control as to the act as a whole. 8 7 While there are no actual deci-
sions on the point, the attorney general has taken the view that
an otherwise referrable section of a measure might be subject to
referendum even if combined with sections excluded from the
device. 88 The referendum would doubtless be available as against
a measure repealing a state tax. This observation is offered de-
spite its academic ring!
With respect to the second exception, that for current ex-
penses of the state, the court, by Robinson, J., has said, "Our
conception of the phrase, as used in our constitution, is that 'cur-
rent expenses', in addition to including the expenses incident to
officering (sic) and maintaining the state government, includes
the preserving in repair and maintaining of the property of the
state government, and, as applied to roads, includes the main-
taining and repairing thereof, as distinguished for new construc-
Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), it was held that a congressional
redistricting act was referrable. And see 1917 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No.
153, wherein it was ruled that an act of the general assembly extending suf-
frage to women in presidential elections was subject to the referendum.
182 OMO CoNsT. Art. Il, § 1. The referendum is limited to "laws" and bills
not passed may not be referred. 1913 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 248.
183 OHIO CoNsT. Art. II, § id.
184 State ex Tel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 NE. 16 (1923).
18s Ibid.
186 State ex rel. Schrieber v. Ailray, 88 Ohio St. 301, 102 N. 959 (1913).
187 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 NXE. 16 (1923).
ISS 1943 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 6207.
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tion."189
In the only case in which the court was directly faced with
the problem of divisibility of an act, the court held that none of
its provisions were subject to the referendum. Thus, where an
appropriation bill for current expenses included a condition that
certain vouchers must show that competitive bids were secured,
it was held that this condition was effective immediately upon the
passage of the bill and would not be subject to the referendum. 90
While a capital outlay item in a general appropriation bill would
be subject to referendum the court considered a condition attached
to a current expense item a part, in effect, of that item.
An entirely different attitude of the court is seen in its con-
struction of the third exception - that dealing with emergency
laws. The constitution provides that "emergency laws upon a yea
and nay vote must receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each branch of the general assembly, and the reasons
for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which
section shall be passed only by a yea and nay vote, upon a sepa-
rate roll call thereon." 191 It will be seen that there is no specific
requirement that there be a two-thirds vote on the emergency
clause, but that is not a matter of moment since that quality of
vote must be had on final passage. 192 It is the practice to have a
two-thirds vote on the emergency clause before it is added to the
proposed bill for final vote.1 93 Should an emergency bill be passed
by both branches of the general assembly in varied forms and
neither house would accept the other's version, the second vote in
each house, after a conference committee had ironed out the dif-
ferences, would again be subject to a two-thirds majority. 94
The real difficulty encountered with respect to this exception
is whether a legislative determination of an emergency is justi-
ciable. In the first case in which this question could have been
answered, the supreme court simply held that the reasons given
for declaring the Conservancy Act to be an emergency measure
189 State ex rel. Janes v. Brown, 112 Ohio St. 590, 601, 142 N.E. 37 (1925).
The attorney general has ruled that the costs of construction of a building
for women at a state university cannot be deemed to be current expense.
1919 Ops. Afty Gen. (Ohio) No. 308.
190 State ex rel. The Davies Manufacturing Co. v. Donahey, 94 Ohio St.
382, 114 N.E. 1037 (1916).
19 1 OIo CoNsT. Art. II, § Id.
192 But see 1915 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 159 to the effect that there
must be a separate two-thirds vote for an emergency clause.
193 See, e.g., Rule 63, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General
Assembly of the State of Ohio (1949).
194 Rule 16, Joint Rules of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly of the
State of Ohio (1949).
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were valid.19s Shortly thereafter the court by dictum, carried into
the syllabus, stated that the emergency character of an act could
be challenged "in a proper proceeding and at a proper time. 1
96
When first directly faced with the problem, the court split into
three camps. 197 Two members believed that if the legislative
formalities required were met, the determination of an emergency
by the assembly would be conclusive. These two, joined by two
others, were of the opinion that if the legislative determination
were not conclusive, it should be presumed valid and any repug-
nancy with the true situation must be obvious. In three strongly-
worded dissents, the minority favored a complete examination
and review of the determination of emergency. One saving element
in the majority opinion (and undoubtedly approved by the minority
judges) was the dictum that certain features of an emergency
clause are justiciable; namely, that the necessary two-thirds vote
was had, that the general assembly has set forth the reasons for
such declaration,19s and that the emergency clause passed upon
a yea and nay vote on a separate roll call.199 Sixteen years later,
the court by a four-to-two vote, definitely held that the courts will
not review a legislative determination of an emergency.20 0 The
court relied on the earlier case and a case20 1 dealing with an
analogous code section.
Further limitations upon the referendum power of the people
might be found in the distinction between statutes purely legis-
lative in character and those of an administrative or executive
nature. No Ohio cases relating to statutes have been found. On the
local level, it has been held that an ordinance fixing the rate for
the furnishing of natural gas to a city, notwithstanding that it
contained additional related matters concerning service, was not
subject to the referendum.20 2 As already noted, the municipal
195 Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ohio St. 407, 110 N.E. 1068 (1914).
16 liami County v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915).
197 State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921).
For a review of the Ohio and other state cases on this problem, see Comment,
1 OHo ST. L. J. 40 (1935).
193 In an analogous case involving a municipal ordinance, it was held
that failure of the council to set forth the reasons for its declaration of
emergency was fatal. A mere statement that the ordinance was necessary
for the preservation of public peace, health and safety was considered but a
conclusion, without reasons, and not sufficient. Goodman v. Youngstown,
24 Ohio L. Abs. 696 (1937).
199 102 Ohio St. 591, 598, 133 N.E. 457 (1921).
200 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937).
201 lolcomb v. State ex rel. Coxey, Sr., 126 Ohio St. 496, 186 N.E. 99 (1933).
202 The Union Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 33 Ohio Law Rep.
214 (1930). It has been held that where a city has determined to construct
a public utility, ordinances incidental to and in furtherance of the original
measure are not subject to referendum under Section 5 of Article XVIII of
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initiative and referendum are apart from home rule charter pro-
visions, controlled by statute. Even if the Ohio courts do adopt
the general theory of excluding ordinances of an administrative
nature, this should not affect their holdings on state legislation.
There is no more basis here than in the case of the initiative for
restricting the scope of electoral action by interpretation. The
statute exempting certain ordinances from the referendum is
worded much differently from Section le of Article H.203 While
the constitution reserves to the electors of the state the power to
adopt "any law" the provision as to municipalities reserves the
power "on all questions which such municipalities may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action."20 4
(italics ours).
Referendum Procedure
Generally, the provisions, both constitutional and statutory,
dealing with the initiative and referendum treat related features
of each together. While the two systems are quite separate many
of the procedural steps for the initiative apply equally to the
referendum. Particular note will be taken here only of features
of the referendum peculiar to that device.
The initial steps of a one-hundred signature petition, summary
and certificate of that summary by the attorney general are re-
quired. A referendum petition, however, is limited to one act or
part thereof.2 05 The printing, control, and payment for petitions is
handled as in the case of initiative petitions. The secretary of state
may, however, refuse to issue blank petitions against laws not
subject to referendum and mandamus will not lie against him.205
The form of referendum petitions is slightly different. The
words "referendum petition" are placed at the top of the petition.20 7
Unlike the initiative, the constitution requires no particular cap-
tion for referendum petitions; this gap has, however, been filled
by a statute requiring that following the date of issuance of the
petition must come the words, "To be submitted to the electors
for their approval or rejection. '208 Then follows the title, which
must contain a brief legislative history of the law, section or item
the constitution. State ex rel. Didelius v. Commissioner, 131 Ohio St. 356,
2 N.E. 2d 862 (1936), overruling State ex rel. Diehl, Jr. v. Abele, 119 Ohio
St. 210, 162 N.E. 807 (1928). If the later ordinances materially modified the
basic one that would be another matter.
203 OHIo GEN. CODE § 4227-3.
204 OHIO CoNsT. Art. II, § If.
205 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933).
206 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937);




of law sought to be referred. The remainder of the petition follows
the form of initiative petitions, 09 except that following the text
of the law to be referred appears the certificate of the secretary
of state that the law, section or item of law, as shown, has been
found to be a true copy of the enrolled bill or the pertinent part
of it.
The issuance of blank part-petitions to circulators and the
related procedures are exactly the same as for initiative petitions.
The constitution provides that petitions seeking to have a
law or part of a law referred shall bear the signatures of six per
centum of the electors.210 Again, it is required that there be signa-
tures of not less than one-half of the designated percentage of
electors of each of one-half of the counties in the state.
The requirements and qualifications for signers of these peti-
tions are exactly the same as for initiative petitions. So it is with
respect to the circulation and verification of petitions.
Although all part-petitions must be filed together, the pro-
visions relating to time of filing referendum petitions are quite
different from those concerning initiative petitions. To be effective
referendum petitions must be filed with the secretary of state
within ninety days after the law which is to be referred shall have
been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary.2 1' This
time is to be computed by excluding the date upon which the law
was filed in the office of the secretary of state.212 Further, the date
of approval by the governor is not important or effective in de-
termining effective dates of referrable statutes.213 By excluding
the filing day and permitting petitions to be filed at any time on
the ninetieth day, the petitioners actually have ninety-plus days
in which to file. One court of appeals has taken the view that
should the ninetieth day be a Sunday a further day is given.214
While the constitutional provisions seem clear as to bills passed
in the ordinary course and approved by the govenor, there is a
void as to bills passed over a veto or allowed to become law by
lapse of time. Only when the governor approves a bill is he specific-
ally required to file the bill with the secretary of state.215 Yet
209 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-176 provides in part: "The general provisions
heretofore set forth relative to the form and order of an initiative petition,
shall be, so far as practical, applicable to a referendum petition .210 Omo CoNsr. Art. II, § 1c.
211 TbhiL
212 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933).
213 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915).
214 State ex rel. Mack v. Heuck, 38 Ohio Law Rep. 33 (1933). The supreme
court, in affirming, found it unnecessary to pass on this issue. Heuck v. State
ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933). Contra: 1927 Ops. Att'y
Gen. (Ohio) No. 281.
215 OHIo CoNsr. Art. 11, § 16.
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referendum petitions must be filed within ninety days after the
governor has filed a bill. In the case of a bill passed over a veto it
would seem logical to say that a petition could be filed within
ninety days after that bill was filed with the secretary by officers
of the general assembly. Since bills becoming law by lapse of time
are in the hands of the governor, the burden of filing must be on
him, and thus the ninety-day period would begin when he did file.
While no authority can be found for these propositions, they have
strong rational support. Measures not signed by the governor are
not within the express exceptions to the referendum and the ques-
tion here derives simply from a gap left in the drafting of the
ninety-day clause.216
As with supplementary initiative petitions, used when the
initiated proposal is amended and passed, the filing of a refer-
endum petition suspends the effective date of an act to be re-
ferred.217 Whether the general assembly may repeal or amend an
act while in this state of suspension has not been adjudicated.2 S
When a referendum petition attacks only part of a law, the re-
mainder goes into effect in the regular manner. If the voters approve
the measure or part, as the case may be, it takes effect when the
election results are determined. 219
The examination and rejection of petitions or signatures are
administered in the same manner as those for the initiative.220
The same is true as to protests and supplementary petitions used
for the ten-day period granted to obtain additional signatures.
The provisions relating to information for the electors are
the same as for initiative proposals save that the persons pre-
paring arguments or explanations, or both, against a measure may
be named in the petition while those preparing the material for
the measure are named by the general assembly if in session, or if
216 OHO CONST. Art. II, § 16 reads in part: "No law passed by the general
assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by
the governor in the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided
." Since this last clause has been held to refer to Art. II, § 1d, which
exempts certain legislative acts from the referendum, State v. Lathrop, 93
Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915), a very strict interpretation of the section
would not only exclude bills passed over a veto from the referendum, but
would also preclude such bills from ever becoming effective.
217 Compare Omo CoNST. Art. I, § Ic with Art. II, § lb.
218 The attorney general has ruled that the assembly may amend an act
after the governor has approved and before the ninety-day waiting peried
has elapsed, at least until a referendum has been ordered on it. 1915 Ops.
Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 325.
219 OHIo CoNsT. Art. II, § 1c.
220The secretary of state may, however, refuse to submit to referendum
an act containing an emergency clause. 1914 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1124.
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not, by the governor.22' Various code sections, including the one
dealing with publicity pamphlets,2 2 call for a printing of the
text of the law to be initiated or referred. In the case of the refer-
endum, confusion may result when but a section or item of a law
is attacked. For publicity pamphlets the constitution requires that
the secretary of state shall cause to be printed "the law, or pro-
posed law, or proposed amendment to the constitution. 223 The
statute, on the other hand, requires the printing of the "text of
each measure to be submitted."2 2 4 Should but one section or item
of a law be referred, it would be very confusing to have the whole
law printed without clear identification of the part under attack.
On the oter hand, the reading of one section of a law, without
seeing the remainder, would usually not be very enlightening. A
better method, and one which would doubtless be substantial com-
pliance, would be to print the complete act, italicizing the parts
to be deleted should the referendum be successful.
The ballot is governed by the same provisions as in the case
of the initiative. Referred bills are treated as initiated measures
in that a "yes" vote is used to support the law. Due to the old
voter's creed, "in case of doubt, vote no," this might seem inad-
visable. The record of Ohio referrals might be shown to substantiate
this danger; out of the ten bills referred to date, only one has
been ratified. The ballot is printed so that the issue can be submit-
ted to the voters at the next succeeding general or regular election
in any year occurring subsequent to sixty days after the filing of the
petition.225 It will be recalled that the attorney general has inter-
preted a similar provision as to constitutional amendments to
mean that the issue must be submitted in the year the petition
is filed.226 This becomes important as to a protracted session of
the legislature since one hundred fifty days from July 1, for ex-
ample, would carry beyond election day.
Should the voters reject a referred act designed to repeal
or amend a law, that law would remain effective.227
As already noted, a referred measure does not become effec-
tive unless and until approved by the voters. There is no express
provision making the veto applicable to the referendum, but it
does not fit. If the governor had approved the measure the voters
would simply be concurring. If the governor had failed to act or
disapproved the bill he would already have had his chance and no
221 Omio CO:iST. Art. II, § 1g; Oao Gm. CODE § 4735-180a.
222 Oao GEN. CODE § 4785-1SOb.
223 OHo CONST. Art II, § 1g.
2 24 Omo GEN. CODE § 4785-180b.
22S Omo CoxsT. Art. II, § lc.
226 See note 87, stvpra.
227 1915 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) No. 725.
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reason can be found for giving him two chances to kill a measure.
In contrast to the initiative provision, there is no express
clause dealing with conflicting provisions caused by the referen-
dum. Such a conflict might be caused, for example, by two petitions,
one of which referred section one of an act and the other referred
sections one and two. Should the first submission be approved,
the voters would be expressing a desire that section one be the law;
should the second submission be rejected the voters would be say-
ing that section one should not be the law.
CONCLUSION
In a paper of this character it behooves the authors to leave
the reader to draw his own conclusions. The latter will readily
discern, for example, that the initiative can be used to submit
constitutional amendments without sifting by any deliberative
body and, thus, that, in an important sense, Ohio takes greater
care in legislative action than in modifying the organic law. He will
observe, further, that the processes of popular legislation are rather
ponderous but that the general assembly has considered it neces-
sary to add refinements in procedure to preserve the integrity
of the process.
There are deeper policy considerations which should be ex-
plored. We shall conclude by merely suggesting one or two of
them in the form of questions. Is popular legislation any more
free than representative action from the influence of pressure
groups? Is it calculated to increase or decrease responsibility in
our legislative assemblies? Does it consist with modern develop-
ments, which provide various research and drafting aids for our
legislatures and enable them to conduct the policy-making function
on a more continuous non-fragmentary basis? Can the voters be
expected to exercise informed judgment except on proposals in-
volving clear-cut, easily understood issues? There is much interest
in the short ballot. Are the short ballot and popular legislation
consistent?
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